Introducing New Cultivars: Needs vs. Risks
W. H. Brokaw
President, Brokaw Nursery, Inc.,
and Director,
New varieties in produce are essential to progress in
the fresh food industry. Every year, we have new varieties of annual plants;
and farmers eagerly plant them. New subtropical fruit varieties are a different
matter. Many of them are considered, but few are adopted. A principal reason is
the risk entailed by planting unproven perennial cultivars which require
formidable capital investments to bring into production. After that comes the
marketing challenge, especially if a satisfactory variety is already available
in quantity.
So, there is a double bind: new varieties are
important; wrong choices are very expensive. What to do?
Needs Versus Risks
Yankees have a special faith. It is that customers
will always prefer any reasonable priced product of better quality.
In the actual commerce of varieties of seasonal
fruits, however, the product does not always sell, and expected profits are not
always realized. The introductions are savored by their discoverers,'friends,
and others; but they rarely make it to the larger market place.
Sometimes, the product really isn't better; it only
appears and tastes as if it were. Perhaps it is really flawed: it ships poorly,
only ripens well when it is still on the tree, isn't prolific, and/or possesses
some other deficiency. Sometimes, though, the variety really is good; yet, even
so, its introduction is difficult, slow, and chancy. This is ironic, for we
need an assortment of suitable varieties. An industry too dominated by a single
variety, or that produces too few varieties, is vulnerable. It is more
threatened than it needs to be by diseases, changes in the weather, and the
natural cycles of over-and under-production. Further, it is subject to strict
season limitations.
Ideally, we need many varieties, so that we can
produce fruit all year long and more or less equally abundantly from year to
year.
What follows is a story about how
Pinkerton
History
About 1968, the late John Pinkerton found a seedling
avocado in his grove which bore abundant green fruit of high quality. It was
prolific; tasted good; and had a rough, tough, Hass-like skin and a small seed.
Further, it ripened more slowly than most varieties, giving it a long shelf
life that was thought to be an advantage.
Everyone loved John's new variety. Friends
topworked a few trees to it, and had high hopes. John
patented it.
About 1973, John's foreman approached me about the
variety, and recommended that I plant it. When he informed me that it matured
about April, in the Hass season, I politely declined his recommendation. Upon
learning, however, that when harvested earlier, it might compete with the Fuerte variety, I was interested. The Fuerte
was in trouble in
Brokaw Nursery planted the first commercial orchard
of Pinkerton—2,400 trees—in 1974. It was noticed by other early-adopting
growers. Indeed, most of these Pinkertons, both ours
and those of others, bore well as had been predicted. There were some early
problems regarding excessively long and "necky"
fruit, but these generally became less serious and nearly disappeared with
time. There were problems in ripening and uneven ripening with barely mature
fruit. The extra long shelf life proved not to be the advantage we had
expected, since new industry marketing efforts aimed at increasing fast turnover
of fruit at retail. There were, however, desirable qualities: the fruit was
large, handsome, tough, had a small seed, and was as
good as Hass in April and better than Hass in January.
About 1983, we heard criticism by packers. "Pinkertons are too 'necky',"
they said. They wouldn't ripen evenly, and they couldn't be stored under
refrigeration. The packers reported a stream of "bad arrivals." They
said, "The consumer doesn't want them; she wants Hass." The supply of
The outlook for Pinkerton growers was grave, since
most of the adverse reports came from Calavo Growers
of California, the dominant cooperative and largest of
Growers were skeptical of the criticisms because, in
the prior year, Pinkertons had become, on a per-pound
basis, the second best revenue producing avocado variety in
PGC financed itself on a voluntary basis.
Grower-donated funds were used for such things as merchandising calls, sample
fruit cartons, point-of-sale materials, and advertising. Participation was
marvelous. In 1986, the organization hired a professional merchandiser.
Serious problems showed up in 1985-86. There were
many bad arrivals, and there was a strong backlash against Pinkertons
at the buyer level. Grower investigations indicated that the spoiled Pinkertons had been overharvested
because of a temporarily "hot" market. Handlers endeavored to hold
out for high prices in order to please Pinkerton growers. Consequently, PGC
sponsored postharvest research projects and continued
to work with handlers.
PGC made a big difference, but part of that
difference came from two unexpected quarters. First, Safeway Stores, after
nearly rejecting the variety on the basis of its reputation, ordered Pinkertons from Index Mutual, the smaller of the industry's
marketing cooperatives. So pleased was Safeway that they began to run a
season-long special on extra large Pinkertons, at
premium prices. At last, Pinkertons had at least one
continuing market. Index took notice, saw an opportunity, and began to woo
Pinkerton growers, reasoning that their recruitment would bring in added Hass
volume, as well.
Second, Henry Avocado Company, of
Through the years, Pinkerton returns to growers have
been generally good. On a price-per-pound basis, annual averages have
consistently outperformed all varieties other than Hass; and in 1986-87
slightly bested even that variety. We have found that, in general, when Hass is
scarce, its price advantage relative to other varieties is large; when Hass is
abundant, Pinkerton may have the price advantage, simply because it is mostly
harvestable during the "pricey" winter season.
Pinkerton is now at a critical point in its history,
and has a new and different problem. Now that customers have come to know,
like, and use the variety, our problem is that Pinkerton growers cannot supply
enough of it. They cannot offer the dependable, continuous supply of uniform
fruit that the large modern retail grocery chains require. Consequently, they
are having to limit sales to small
"high-end" chains—outlets that feature unusual and consistently high
quality products at high prices.
Hass/Pinkerton
Market Development Comparisons
Early Hass history differs in important respects from
Pinkerton history, but there are some striking similarities as well. Hass, too,
was perceived as having a different season than Fuerte,
which was then the standard. The "upstart" Hass was criticized
because it was black-skinned, rough, and small. It received little special
attention by the industry's principal marketer (Calavo)
or by avocado handlers generally. Only one small handler, United Avocado
Growers, promoted and aggressively marketed the variety as
"premium-worthy." Acceptance of Hass as a superior commercial variety
was slow—by packers, distributors, retailers, and end users.
Although Hass was always a relatively better revenue
producer than its chief competitor, Fuerte's
near-universal acceptability was a problem for Hass; and Hass growers wisely
stayed away from the Fuerte season. Hass, they said,
was a summer and fall (May-October) variety.
Pinkerton growers tried to do the same thing: market
into the winter when there were no Hass. The strategy was partly neutralized
when over-produced Hass in the 1980s were stuffed into that market as well as
remaining in the summer market.
As noted, Calavo and most
independent avocado marketers took the Hass in stride, allowing it to find its
own market niche without major special promotion. Although my historical view
is that the major marketer, Calavo,
"rejected" the Hass in its early history, a Calavo
source vigorously denies charges of "rejection" of Hass or
"bias" in favor of Fuerte. Calavo, the spokesman argues, did recognize the superior
qualities of the variety and placed the limited volume available (less than 300
pounds in 1940, the first year of Hass receipt by Calavo;
about 60,000 pounds five years later) in selected markets where acceptance
could be built.
Many of the early Hass growers were small producers
not affiliated with Calavo. Their production was
marketed through United Avocado Growers, a packer that became a specialist in
Hass with tailor-made merchandising and promotion. I believe this was a
fortunate factor in speeding the introduction of Hass as a commercial variety.
The Henry Avocado Company might have served Pinkerton
growers in a similar fashion, but chose not to do so because it did not control
enough of the supply. Most growers of Pinkerton were larger producers and were
more closely tied to Calavo than was the early
situation of Hass. Index Mutual, however, maintained a special interest in the
opportunities for Pinkerton and paved the way toward more effective
merchandising of it.
Where Pinkerton will go from here is a guess. Its
days of "bad press" appear to be over. It is now recognized as a
superior variety and a good alternative to Hass when Hass sizes are too small.
But we need more fruit, if a market is to be developed. The problem has become
not "why Pinkerton?", but "where are the Pinkertons?"
The future really depends on growers.
Summary
Study and experience of the introduction of these two
varieties furnish some valuable lessons, if we can just remember them. I have
summarized below some of the things I believe Pinkerton growers have learned:
1. No new variety makes it on its own. It needs a
sponsor, "political" support, and a handler who will learn its
eccentricities and back it up.
2. An industry-dominant cooperative is likely to be a
frustrating medium for new variety introduction for growers impatient for
returns on their investment. It is large, likely to be conservative, has
established its "product," and tends toward inflexibility because of
these characteristics. I believe its attitude may reflect concern by
owner-directors that a new variety threatens their variety investments.
3. Most packers and nearly all secondary distributors
do not want to be bothered with another variety, "new-and-improved"
or not. They are too busy. Distributors, for example, are selling potatoes,
turnips, broccoli, and a hundred other items over a buzzing phone; one more
variety of avocado is one more complication.
4. When a handler or distributor says, "The
housewife doesn't like it," take the message with a grain of salt. It may
be his .code for, "I can't be bothered."
5. When a handler says, "Nobody wants it,"
watch out. Take a box of samples to a buyer and see if that is true.
Pinkerton growers who personally promoted the variety
really offended some handlers when they did this. The handlers protested,
"That's our job. You are confusing the buyers." Don't be dissuaded.
The growers sold lots of Pinkertons that way.
6. Form a variety-support committee of cooperative
growers. Organized, they have clout, and handlers pay attention.
Warning: Cooperate with the handlers. They will
respond, especially if you cooperate more than the industry average.
Early-adopters usually do.
7. Once you know the consumer likes your product when
it is properly presented, refocus your efforts to the middlemen, handlers, and
buyers. These are the decision makers, and they need most of your attention. If
you can convince buyers that you have a superior product, can produce it
consistently (that is, have enough supply), and that they can sell it, they
will get behind you.
8. Plant a significant acreage early. One needs a
"critical mass" of fruit to start. I believe that our 950 acres of Pinkertons were barely enough to get started in the
New products such as new varieties are a lot of fun. and they benefit all kinds of people. One needs to be a bit
wary, however, in introducing them. A hunger for work and a feel for politics
help, too.
Bear in mind that an industry resting on too few
varieties is terribly vulnerable—to disease, to environmental stresses, to
desperate and shortsighted efforts of growers to stretch out the seasons, and
to foreign competition when seasonal supplies are low. Know that message,
preach the message, and keep the new varietal
candidates coming!